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“Fair and Full Employment”:† Forty Years of 
Unfulfilled Promises 
Adam W. Aston* 
I enlist every employer, every labor union, and every agency of 
Government—whether affected directly by these measures or 
not—in the task of seeing to it that no false lines are drawn in 
assuring equality of the right and opportunity to make a decent 
living. 
—President John F. Kennedy1 
INTRODUCTION 
While President John F. Kennedy’s promise to put a man on the 
moon2 may be more memorable, Kennedy’s announcement of a civil 
rights bill in June of 1963 may have provided the greatest long-term 
effect on American society of any policy initiative in his 
administration.3 Kennedy intended the Civil Rights Act to improve 
 † John F. Kennedy, Special Message to the Congress on Civil Rights and Job 
Opportunities, 1963 PUB. PAPERS 483, 488 (June 19). 
 * B.S. (2000), Texas A&M University; J.D. Candidate (2004), Washington University 
School of Law. 
 1. John F. Kennedy, Special Message to the Congress on Civil Rights and Job 
Opportunities, 1963 PUB. PAPERS 483, 491 (June 19) [hereinafter Special Message]. President 
Kennedy addressed the need to pass legislation to preserve the rights of African-Americans 
with respect to education, employment, and public accommodations. Id. at 484. 
 2. In an address to a joint session of Congress outlining several new proposals to carry 
out the Cold War, President Kennedy suggested that the space program was an integral part of 
winning the Cold War. John F. Kennedy, Special Message to Congress on Urgent National 
Needs, 1961 PUB. PAPERS 396, 404 (May 25). The most important goal for the space program, 
Kennedy announced, was for “this nation [to] commit itself to achieving the goal, before this 
decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to the earth.” Id. 
 3. President Kennedy addressed the nation on June 11, 1963 in response to the struggle 
over integration at the University of Alabama. John F. Kennedy, Radio and Television Report 
to the American People on Civil Rights, 1963 PUB. PAPERS 468, 469–70 (June 11) [hereinafter 
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race relations and provide equality for African Americans.4 When the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed, however, it achieved far more.5  
Among the provisions in the Civil Rights Act, Title VII declared it 
unlawful for employers6 to discriminate against a person based on 
any one of five characteristics.7 From the beginning, the statutory 
definition of “employer” required a minimum number of employees 
before a business could be found in violation of Title VII.8 Because 
of this requirement, small businesses remain shielded from 
discrimination claims under Title VII, and individuals who apply for 
Radio and Television]. He announced his intention to present Congress with an act for civil 
rights in education, public facilities, and the workplace to combat the “moral crisis” facing the 
nation. Id. at 468–70. Kennedy stated “[i]t is a time to act in the Congress, in your State and 
local legislative body and, above all, in all of our daily lives.” Id. at 469. 
 4. Id. at 470. 
 5. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1971–2000 (2000). The Civil Rights Act of 1964 
establishes a prohibition of discrimination in voting rights, access to public accommodations 
and facilities, public education, federally assisted programs, and employment. Id. 
 6. The statutory definition of an “employer” under Title VII currently reads: “[A] person 
engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each 
working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar 
year, and any agent of such a person.” Id. § 2000e(b). However, this has not always been the 
Title VII definition. When originally passed, the Civil Rights Act set the minimum employee 
requirement at twenty-five. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88–352, Title VII, § 701, 78 
Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000)). The current minimum of fifteen 
employees has been the statutory requirement since the 1972 Amendment to the Civil Rights 
Act. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92–261, 86 Stat. 103 (1970 ed. 
Supp. V).  
 7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a) (2000). The Act states: 
 It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer— 
  (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin; or 
  (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in 
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment 
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such 
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 
Id. 
 Section 2000e–2 also prohibits employment agencies, labor organizations, and training 
programs from using discriminatory practices. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2 (b)–(d) (2000). 
 8. During the initial stages of debate leading to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, a minimum-employee requirement of 100 was also considered. This number was 
considered as a permanent number and, alternatively, as the initial step in a gradual reduction of 
the number of employees required for Title VII employer liability. See infra notes 28, 49, 52–53 
and accompanying text.  
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employment at these businesses, along with those who work there, 
may be without legal remedy for acts of discrimination. 
This Note proposes to change the definition of “employer” to 
include all businesses “engaged in an industry affecting commerce,”9 
regardless of the number of employees. The minimum-employee 
requirement is arbitrary, fails to advance the overall purpose of Title 
VII, and provides an inaccurate picture of a business’s ability to 
defend against a suit for discrimination.  
Part I of this Note examines the history of liability under Title VII 
for discrimination by an employer. It begins with an examination of 
the statutory definition of “employer,” focusing on the current fifteen 
employee minimum and how that minimum became law. This Part 
also addresses Congress’s rationale behind the adoption of a 
“minimum” requirement in Title VII. 
Part II analyzes why Congress found a twenty-five-employee 
requirement necessary for the civil rights legislation and how this 
requirement became part of Title VII when passed in 1964. Analysis 
of the legislative history of Title VII provides an explanation for the 
initial belief that a “minimum” was necessary. Then the Note 
discusses the legislative history of the 1972 amendment to Title VII, 
which lowered the minimum requirement to fifteen employees. This 
analysis also addresses the concerns raised on behalf of small 
businesses during the debate that caused the reduction of the 
minimum-employee requirement in the 1972 amendment.  
Part III of this Note proposes that Congress take a further look at 
the fifteen-employee minimum. It suggests that the reasons for the 
1972 reduction are also present today. Current business practices, 
such as the extensive use of technology that curbs the need for face-
to-face meetings between employees, give certain businesses with 
few employees anything but a “mom and pop” feel. This Note further 
suggests that as we continue to grow as a society, it becomes less 
acceptable for any business—even one with fewer than fifteen 
employees—to discriminate when making hiring decisions. The Note 
argues that setting any minimum-employee requirement to establish 
employer liability is arbitrary and inconsistent with the overall 
 9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000). 
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remedial purpose of Title VII. Further, the employee minimum, even 
when set as low as fifteen, leaves many American workers without a 
federal remedy for employment discrimination. This Note also 
suggests that a business’s “number of employees” no longer gives a 
complete, or accurate, indication of the business’s ability to defend 
against lawsuits. To the extent a judicial award to a successful 
plaintiff is based on the value of the job opportunity the plaintiff was 
denied, a business with any number of employees should have the 
resources to defend against such a suit and to pay damages if the suit 
is lost. While this Note argues that there is no justification for having 
a minimum-employee requirement of any kind because of the 
importance of a fair and just workplace, should a minimum threshold 
for Title VII liability be desired, the Note suggest the requirement 
should be set with an eye to the business’s assets or profits. A 
threshold requirement based on a business’s financial situation, rather 
than on the number of employees, would provide a more accurate 
picture of whether an employer is capable of defending against a 
Title VII discrimination suit. 
This Note concludes with a summary of the analysis of the 
minimum-employee requirement that serves as a threshold to Title 
VII liability and the recommendation for a change to the definition of 
“employer” as it is used in Title VII to eliminate the minimum-
employee requirement.  
I. HISTORY 
A. Title VII Employer Liability Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 began to take shape in 196310 as 
President Kennedy’s response to the discriminatory treatment of 
African Americans,11 and it directly stemmed from the violence in 
 10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971–2000 (2000). The Act was first introduced in Congress in 1963. 
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: CIVIL RIGHTS PART II 
1017–18 (1970). Some of its provisions were debated in 1963, but none were passed until the 
following year. Id.  
 11. See supra note 3. President Kennedy asked Congress to “enact legislation giving all 
Americans the right to be served in [public] facilities . . . [and] end segregation in public 
eduction.” Radio and Television, supra note 3, at 470. Kennedy described the employment 
difficulties faced by African-Americans, who were two or three times as likely to be 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol15/iss1/12
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Birmingham, Alabama that surrounded the Civil Rights movement.12 
Initial response to Kennedy’s bill was poor.13 Passage of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 came as a result of two key factors: the 
assassination of President Kennedy14 and Lyndon B. Johnson’s 
shifting views towards civil rights legislation.15 Although Kennedy 
unemployed as those in the white population. Id. He stated these are “matters which concern us 
all, not merely Presidents or Congressmen or Governors, but every citizen of the United States.” 
Id.  
 12. President Kennedy “directly attributed [the bill] to the events of Birmingham.” David 
Benjamin Oppenheimer, Kennedy, King, Shuttlesworth and Walker: The Events Leading to the 
Introduction of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 645, 671 (1995). 
 According to Norbert Schlei, the Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal 
Counsel, who was asked to begin drafting a civil rights bill in response to the May 1963 use of 
force by the Birmingham police against peaceful demonstrators protesting race-based 
discrimination, in early 1963, Kennedy “strongly opposed . . . the sponsorship by the 
Administration of major civil-rights legislation,” but changed his views as a result of 
demonstrations led by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and the violent responses to demonstrations 
in Birmingham. Id. (citing Norbert A. Schlei, Forward to BARBARA L. SCHLEI & PAUL 
GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW, at vii–viii (1976)).  
 In President Kennedy’s address to the nation announcing the civil rights bill, he discussed 
the past events “in Birmingham and elsewhere” and the difficulties faced in integrating the 
University of Alabama earlier that day. Radio and Television, supra note 3, at 468–69.  
 13. See supra note 10. 
 14. In addition to the “dramatic change in the national climate” regarding race relations 
stemming from the civil rights movement in the South, two other key factors led to the 1964 
Act. SCHWARTZ, supra note 10, at 1017.  
 First, the assassination of President Kennedy in November 1963, and the nation’s desire to 
memorialize the fallen President, played an integral role in the passage of the Act. Id. at 1018. 
After Kennedy presented Congress with his civil rights bill in the summer of 1963, little had 
taken place to ensure that it would become law. Id. Upon the assassination of President 
Kennedy, Congress viewed the civil rights bill as the legacy owed to the Kennedy 
administration. Id.  
 In a memorial address to Congress during the week following Kennedy’s assassination, 
President Lyndon Johnson declared, “No memorial oration or eulogy could more eloquently 
honor President Kennedy’s memory than the earliest possible passage of the Civil Rights Bill 
for which he fought so long.” Lyndon B. Johnson, Address Before a Joint Session of Congress, 
1963–64 PUB. PAPERS 8, 9 (Nov. 27, 1963), quoted in SCHWARTZ, supra note 10, at 1018. 
President Johnson was able to convince Congress that the civil rights bill was an appropriate 
and necessary memorial to Kennedy’s legacy. SCHWARTZ, supra note 10, at 1018.  
 15. The second factor, the alteration of Lyndon Johnson’s views on a civil rights bill, also 
played a key role. As the Senate Majority Leader, Johnson had been opposed to achieving civil 
rights through legislation. SCHWARTZ, supra note 10, at 1018. Although Johnson had been 
more supportive of civil rights legislation during the debate surrounding the Civil Rights Act of 
1957, in his final years in the Senate he led “the smallest of steps forward—and it may even 
have been a step back” in the civil rights debate. ROBERT A. CARO, THE YEARS OF LYNDON 
JOHNSON: MASTER OF THE SENATE 1033 (2002). For a discussion of Senator Johnson’s 1957 
determination that the civil rights legislation was necessary, as well as his attempts to convince 
southerners of the need for such legislation, see id. at 863–70, 886–90.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
p285 Aston book pages.doc  4/23/2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
290 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 15:285 
 
 
 
presented his 1963 bill to Congress as a way to combat “the growing 
moral crisis in American race relations”16 exhibited in the continued 
discrimination against African Americans,17 the scope of the Act, 
once passed and signed in to law,18 was far greater.19 
 Caro suggests that, although Johnson’s “interest in the 1960 Democratic presidential 
nomination made it impossible for him to avoid the civil rights issue,” support from the south 
was absolutely necessary, the “sine qua non,” to gaining the party nomination, and that this 
need may have led to Johnson’s views during the 1959–60 congressional sessions. Id. at 1033. 
 As president, however, Johnson made civil rights a top priority in an attempt to change the 
public perception of him as “another parochial southerner.” SCHWARTZ, supra note 10, at 1018. 
During his first State of the Union address, Johnson called on Congress to “be known as the 
session which did more for civil rights than the last hundred sessions combined.” Lyndon B. 
Johnson, Annual Message to Congress on the State of the Union, I PUB. PAPERS 112 (Jan. 8, 
1964), in SCHWARTZ, supra note 10, at 1018. With Johnson’s ability to direct legislation that he 
had developed throughout his service in Congress combined with the resources available to him 
at the White House, passage of “the strongest civil rights measure since Reconstruction was 
soon to become a reality.” SCHWARTZ, supra note 10, at 1018. Caro summarized President 
Johnson’s role in the passage of civil rights legislation: 
[A]s President of the United States, [Lyndon Johnson was able to] ram to passage the 
great Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1965, legislation that would do much to correct the 
deficiencies of the 1957 legislation . . . It was Lyndon Johnson, among all the white 
government officials in twentieth-century America, who did the most to help 
America’s black men and women in their fight for equality and justice. It was he who 
was, among all those officials, their greatest champion. And it was in 1957—in that 
fight for the Civil Rights Act of 1957—that Lyndon Johnson’s capacity to one day be 
that champion was first foreshadowed. 
CARO, supra at 1009.  
 16. Special Message, supra note 1, at 483. 
 17. “[T]he time has come for the Congress of the United States to join with the Executive 
and Judicial Branches in making it clear to all that race has no place in American life or law.” 
Id. Kennedy wrote further:  
 In short, the result of continued Federal legislative inaction will be continued, if not 
increased, racial strife—causing the leadership on both sides to pass from the hands of 
reasonable and responsible men to the purveyors of hate and violence, endangering 
domestic tranquility, retarding our Nation’s economic and social progress and 
weakening the respect with which the rest of the world regards us. No American, I feel 
sure, would prefer this course of tension, disorder and division—and the great majority 
of our citizens simply cannot accept it.  
Id. at 484. 
 18. Congress passed the Civil Rights Act in 1964, and it was signed in to law by President 
Johnson on July 2, 1964. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 10, at 1092. 
 19. The Civil Rights Act addresses the rights and access to public facilities African-
Americans had been denied because of discrimination. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1971–2000 
(2000). As President Kennedy had requested in his message to Congress in June 1963, voting 
rights, education rights, equal employment opportunities, and access to public facilities were 
among the items included in the Act. Special Message, supra note 1, at 483–85. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol15/iss1/12
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In a message to Congress delivered in 1963, President Kennedy 
described combating employment discrimination, which became the 
focus of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, as a call for “fair and full 
employment.”20 Kennedy called for the end of racial discrimination 
in employment and provided the Secretary of Labor and the 
Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity with authority and 
guidelines to “combat this evil in all parts of the country.”21  
Despite his work on and commitment to the bill which would 
become the Civil Rights Act, President Kennedy did not live to see 
its passage through Congress.22 On November 22, 1963, President 
Kennedy was assassinated, and his Vice President, Lyndon B. 
Johnson, was sworn into office. When Lyndon Johnson became 
President, one of his first requests was that Congress enact civil rights 
 However, African-Americans were not the only group to benefit from the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964. For example, in addressing the right to vote, the Act states, “All citizens of the United 
States who are otherwise qualified by law to vote . . . shall be entitled and allowed to vote at all 
such elections, without distinction of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1971(a)(1) (2000). Title II of the Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination in places of public 
accommodation on the grounds of race, color, religion, or national origin. Id. § 2000a. In 
addressing employment discrimination, Title VII prohibits discrimination based on race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin. Id. § 2000e-2.  
 20. Special Message, supra note 1, at 488. Kennedy recognized that “employment 
opportunities . . . play a major role in determining whether the [other civil rights] are 
meaningful. There is little value in . . . obtaining the right to be admitted to hotels and 
restaurants if [an African American] has no cash in his pocket and no job.” Id.  
 21. Id. at 490. The authority granted was intended to address discriminatory practices of 
private employers and unions as well as in employment with the federal government. Id. at 
490–91. 
 22. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 10, at 1017 (stating that civil rights legislation did not pass 
through the first session of the 88th Congress, and no action was taken on the bill because of 
concerns during the committee hearings). 
 Although a civil rights bill was not passed in the first session, the consideration of such a 
bill was a priority for the 88th Congress. H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, at 26 (1964), reprinted in 1964 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2391–92. After 172 bills were referred to a House judiciary subcommittee, 
twenty-two days of hearings were held in the spring and summer of 1963 to discuss the 
legislative proposals contained in the bills. Id. The bills, introduced by both political parties, 
covered nearly every area of civil rights including:  
[V]oting; public accommodations; school desegregation; prohibition of discrimination 
in Federal financial assistance programs; equal protection of laws; antilynching; fair 
employment practices; the Civil Rights Commission; establishment of a Community 
Relations Service; voting and registration statistics according to race, color, and 
national origin; and authorization for the Attorney General to institute civil actions to 
protect and enforce civil rights. 
Id. at 2392. 
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legislation.23 Congress responded, and the Civil Rights Act became 
law on July 2, 1964.24 
At the heart of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act is its prohibition 
of discriminatory practices in employment.25 Because Title VII was 
added to the Act relatively late during the debate in Congress,26 little 
discussion accompanies some of its key provisions.27 The statutory 
definition of “employer,” however, did receive a fair amount of 
debate. In defining “employer,” much of the debate centered on 
whether or not to include a minimum number of employees to trigger 
Title VII liability and what that minimum number should be.28 
Debate focused on a desire to provide protections for small 
businesses and competing concerns over the morality of allowing any 
discrimination to continue.29 
Supporters of a minimum-employee requirement for Title VII 
liability cited the interests of small businesses.30 Senator Norris 
Cotton stated the “principal reason” for establishing an employee-
minimum was to protect the atmosphere of small businesses and the 
relationships formed within them.31 For Sen. Cotton, the “personal 
 23. SCHWARTZ, supra note 10, at 1017 (discussing President Johnson’s call for the civil 
rights bill to answer the continuing need for an end to the inequality faced in America). 
 24. See Oppenheimer, supra note 12, at 672. 
 25. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2 (2000). 
 26. See 110 CONG. REC. 7217 (1964). “Title VII was tacked on to the bill. It was not in 
the original package, it was never taken seriously and was not the subject of careful Committee 
deliberation in the House of Representatives” before the passage of House Bill 7215. Id.; see 
also H.R. REP. NO. 88–914, at 26 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2392 (showing 
an early version of the bill, as approved by the House Judiciary Committee, with “Title VII” 
called “Nondiscrimination in federally assisted programs,” and no title named “Equal 
Employment Opportunity,” which Title VII would be called in the version of the Act finally 
passed by Congress in 1964).  
 27. For example, “sex” was included as one of the five characteristics in Title VII just 
prior to passage of the Act, so there was little debate over the inclusion of “sex” as a part of 
Title VII. See, e.g., Diaz v. Pan Am World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 386 (5th Cir. 1971). 
 28. The protection of small businesses and the ability to choose with whom one works 
were advanced as reasons for setting the employee minimum at a high number. See, e.g., 110 
CONG. REC. 13,087 (1964).  
 29. Senator Morse, D-Or., raised the issue of morality. He argued that, if it is immoral for 
a large employer to discriminate, then it is immoral for a smaller employer to do so. Id. at 
13,089. 
 30. Senator Cotton, R-N.H., was among the more vocal supporters of the need to protect 
small businesses. “[L]et us not reach the small underdog. . . . In this case, small business is the 
underdog.” Id. at 13,087.  
 31. Id. at 13,085. During the debate over Title VII, Senator Cotton stated:  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol15/iss1/12
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relationship” of a small business was worth protecting.32 Another 
justification for the employee-minimum was protecting small 
businesses from the high costs of litigating discrimination claims.33 
Other members of Congress believed no business should be 
allowed to escape Title VII liability and discriminate in employment 
decisions. While these congressmen saw the interests of small 
businesses as important, their key argument was a moral one.34 They 
noted that some state statutes already defined an employer as any 
business with one employee and suggested Congress should write 
federal law to benefit as many workers as possible, including those 
already covered by their own state’s laws.35 Thus, these legislators 
[I]n a small business which employs 30 or 40 persons the personal relationship is 
predominant. I can understand how the Federal Government could operate in 
connection with large factories and industries and in dealing with their employment 
practices, and in seeking, whenever it finds it necessary to do so, to enforce these 
provisions—although I think there are even objections to that. But when a small 
businessman who employs 30 or 25 or 26 persons selects an employee, he comes very 
close to selecting a partner; and when a businessman selects a partner, he comes 
dangerously close to the situation he faces when he selects a wife. 
Id.  
 32. Id. 
 33. See Miller v. Maxwell’s Intern., Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding 
“Title VII limits liability . . . in part because Congress did not want to burden small entities with 
the costs associated with litigating discrimination claims”). 
 34. Senator Morse was one of the more vocal proponents of defining “employer” under 
Title VII independently of the number of employees:  
 To me, the issue is very simple. It is whether or not we will permit, in this 
democracy, discrimination against people because of the color of their skin. That is a 
moral issue as well as a great legal issue. I am at a loss to understand how it can be 
immoral to have an employer of [a particular number of] employees denied the 
exercise of discrimination and have it granted to an employer of fewer than [that 
number].  
 I do not intend to take my eyes off the basic issue, and that is the immorality of 
discrimination . . .  
 It is just as wrong for an employer who employs two people to have that right to 
discriminate as the basis of his employment as it is for an employer of 2,000 
employees to have it. 
110 CONG. REC. 13,089 (1964).  
 35. Senator Humphrey, D-Minn., suggested:  
[M]any problems can be foreseen if there is a wide discrepancy between the coverage 
of State law and Federal law. Federal and State law should be nearly as coextensive as 
possible. For this reason, it appears sound to include within the Federal statute as many 
of the employees covered by State law as possible. 
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argued that allowing large numbers of businesses to escape Title VII 
liability would defeat the purpose of the bill.36 Senator Hubert 
Humphrey compared Title VII to other federal statutes in an effort to 
provide coverage for as many American workers as possible.37 
Senator Humphrey cited the National Labor Relations Act, which 
contained “no minimum requirement for coverage,” and the Fair 
Labor Standards Act, which covered businesses with two or more 
employees, as examples of statutes with broad coverage.38 
The majority of the congressional members supported one of the 
versions of the “employer” definition requiring a minimum number 
of employees for Title VII liability, and the debate shifted to 
determining what number to establish. The House of Representatives, 
in passing House Bill 7152, adopted a definition of “employer” with 
an escalator clause setting the number of employees required to 
establish liability under Title VII.39 The definition of “employer” 
Id. at 13,091.  
 36. Id. 
 37. Senator Humphrey’s remarks in opposition to the Cotton amendment to Title VII, 
which would have limited liability to employers with 100 or more employees were as follows:  
 Other Federal statutes also provide precedent for our consideration of the coverage 
of title VII. In the past, when Congress has enacted legislation to deal with significant 
community problems, the goal always has been to make coverage as broad as possible. 
When Congress has recognized an existing problem, it has tried to deal with that 
problem to the full extent permitted by the Constitution. Why should employment 
discrimination be treated any differently?  
Id. at 13,091.  
 38. Id. Senator Humphrey stated the inequalities between whites and blacks in 
employment were “a momentous problem [requiring] imaginative and far-reaching solutions. 
The need is for drastic action—not feeble, limited steps.” Id. He concluded his remarks by 
stating, “The need for fair employment legislation is imperative. Its scope should be broad and 
encompassing.” Id. 
 39. See H.R. REP. NO. 88–914, at 26 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2402. 
The House Judiciary Committee report, considering House Bill 7152 and recommending it 
pass, states the definition of “employer” shall include a requirement of “25 or more employees, 
except that during the first year after the date the enforcement provisions of the title become 
operative employers having fewer than 100 employees will not be covered, and during the 
second year after such date, employers with fewer than 50 will not be covered.” Id. at 2402. 
 The report states House Bill 7152 “is a constitutional and desirable means of dealing with 
the injustices and humiliations of racial and other discrimination. It is a reasonable and 
responsible bill whose provisions are designed effectively to meet an urgent and most serious 
national problem.” Id. at 2394. 
 Representative Meader, R-Mich., though supporting House Bill 7152, suggested 
eliminating Title VII from the Act until Congress completed further study “required to fashion 
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included those businesses with “25 or more employees,” but provided 
exceptions for the first two years after enactment.40 In the first year, 
an “employer” would have a minimum of 100 employees,41 and in 
the second year, an “employer” would have a minimum of fifty 
employees.42  
Some congressmen expressed concerns over the inclusion of Title 
VII in the bill passed by the House. In the “Additional Minority 
Views” section of the House Judiciary Committee’s report, 
Congressmen Poff43 and Cramer44 questioned the constitutionality of 
Title VII, stating that neither the Interstate Commerce Clause45 nor 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause46 provided a basis for Title 
VII.47  
After House Bill 7152 passed, the Senate began considering the 
civil rights bill. The Senate leadership supported a slightly altered 
version of the definition of “employer.”48 They recommended a more 
appropriate legislative language to this end.” Id. at 2426–27.  
 40. Id. at 2402. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. R-Va. 
 44. R-Fla. 
 45. Supporters of Title VII had argued that constitutional support came from, inter alia, 
the interstate commerce clause. H.R. REP. NO. 88–914, at 26 (1964), reprinted in 1964 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2475. Congressmen Poff and Cramer disagreed, stating that the number of 
employees was suggested as a “rational yardstick by which the interstate commerce concept can 
be measured. [But, o]ut of thin air, the bill pulls a figure and determines that 25 employees is 
the magic number—not 26 or 24 but 25.” Id. The definition of employer, “in an effort to 
strengthen this flimsy yardstick [includes] ‘a person engaged in any industry affecting 
commerce.’” Id. The Supreme Court in Wickard v. Filburn defined “affecting” as “assert[ing] a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce . . . irrespective of whether such effect at some earlier 
time has been defined as ‘direct’ or ‘indirect.’” Id. (citing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 
215 (1942)). Congressmen Poff and Cramer stated that such a definition, combined with the 
vague conferral of powers on the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) by 
Title VII, made it likely the EEOC would “assert plenary jurisdiction over the employment, 
promotion, discharge, and working conditions policies of every [business] which employs 25 or 
more full- or part-time employees.” Id. at 2475–76. They argued that such a broadened version 
of the interstate commerce clause would render the idea of intrastate commerce obsolete. Id. at 
2476.  
 46. Congressmen Poff and Cramer argued that Title VII could not be justified by the 
Fourteenth Amendment privileges and immunities clause because: “(1) no State statute or other 
State action is involved; and (2) the right to employment is not a privilege or immunity 
protected by the privileges and immunities clause of the [Fourteenth Amendment].” Id. at 2477.  
 47. Id. at 2475–77.  
 48. See 110 CONG. REC. 13,088 (1964). Senator Humphrey explained how the minimum-
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gradual reduction in the number of employees, but, like the House 
version, the initial requirement would be set at 100 employees and 
the final requirement would be established at twenty-five 
employees.49 The version supported by the Senate took five years for 
the final twenty-five employee requirement to take effect, rather than 
two.50 
During the debate, Sen. Cotton proposed an amendment to the 
statutory definition of “employer.” He suggested the employee-
minimum permanently remain at 100 employees.51 As justification 
for this amendment, Sen. Cotton described the difficulties the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) would face in 
enforcing Title VII.52 He believed setting the minimum-employee 
requirement at twenty-five would prevent adequate enforcement of 
the Act’s anti-discrimination objectives.53 
employee requirement for Title VII liability was to gradually go into effect after the enactment 
of the Civil Rights Act: In the first year, no enforcement; in the second year, employers with 
100 or more employees are held liable; in the third year, employers with seventy-five or more 
employees are held liable; in the fourth year, employers with fifty or more employees are held 
liable; and in the fifth year, employers of twenty-five or more employees are held liable. Id. 
 The Senate also amended the definition of “employer,” as provided in House Bill 7152, by 
adding “[to include those employed] each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in 
a current or preceding calendar year [as employees]” to an employer’s number of employees for 
determining Title VII liability. Id. at 16,001. The purpose of this amendment was to ensure that 
Title VII liability would extend to businesses that employ only seasonal workers. Id. at 7216–
17.  
 49. Id. at 13,088. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 13,085. “My amendment would strike out that portion [of Title VII that 
gradually reduces the minimum employee requirement], so that the provision would apply 
permanently, under this bill, only to establishments with 100 or more employees.” Id. 
 52. Senator Cotton argued: 
 The principle reason for proposing the adoption of this amendment is, first, the 
problem of enforcement. If it became necessary for the Federal Government to 
investigate every complaint and to take steps in every situation brought to its attention, 
in connection with the small businesses of the country employing only 25 or 35 or 40 
or 50 or 60 persons, enforcement will become well nigh impossible; and the 
enforcement which did occur would be found to be spotty.  
 I am not suggesting that those to be entrusted with enforcement of this law, if it is 
enacted, would purposely or necessarily harass the business community; but I am 
suggesting that when we enact a law, we do so, not in light of what reasonable men 
would do in enforcing it, but in light of what unreasonable men might do. 
Id. 
 53. He argued that “this will be an impracticable and unenforceable provision if 
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Senator Cotton also addressed the important role that the work 
environment plays in a small business. He suggested that to succeed, 
a small business needed to keep an atmosphere of “congeniality.”54 
He applauded the role of small businesses in America55 and explained 
the difficulties facing them due to the burdens the federal government 
placed on their owners.56 Senator Cotton suggested the reasonable 
course to take would be to leave Title VII coverage to larger 
businesses.57 With his arguments falling largely on deaf ears, Sen. 
Cotton’s final justification for restraint was his uncertainty that the 
new agency charged with enforcing the comprehensive legislation 
would be successful.58 
Senator Everett Dirksen59 led the opposition to the Cotton 
amendment.60 He stated that the discrepancies between the federal 
eventually the requirement is dropped to 25 employees.” Id. 
 54. “A small business . . . stands or falls, in this age of competition, on the congeniality 
and skill and ability of the man or partners who own it and the persons who work for them and 
work with them.” Id. 
 55. Senator Cotton stated:  
[D]uring the years I have served in Congress, I have seen more tender tears flow and 
more pathetic arguments made on behalf of the small businesses in this country than I 
have seen in behalf of almost any other operation or business activity. We have heard, 
and we know, that the small businesses along the main streets or in the villages and 
towns and cities are the backbone of our country and of our free enterprise system.  
Id.  
 56. Senator Cotton continued: 
We know the Federal Government has made it very hard for them to operate. We 
know that the Federal Government burdens them with taxes, and we know that the 
Federal Government has them investigated on all sorts and kinds of scores. We know 
that the Attorney General and his agents watch them; and we know that all small 
manufacturing establishments are required to abide by the minimum wage law and the 
wages and hours law; and we know that whenever a problem of national origin or 
religion arises, either this law will not be enforced or else it will become a monstrosity. 
Id.  
 57. Senator Cotton pleaded, “[I]n the interest of reason, in the interest of safety, in the 
interest of adhering to what we have always believed were the fundamental tenets of this 
country, I ask consideration of this small proposal which would merely eliminate 
establishments with fewer than 100 employees.” Id. at 13,087.  
 58. Id. He reasoned, “[I]t is proposed to give the Government blanket authority in the very 
beginning, when we have never had a Fair Employment Practices Commission under the 
Federal Government, when it is a new departure, a new venture, and men must be trained.” Id. 
He continued, “I suggest that we give the provision a chance to see how it works. But let us not 
take this step.” Id. 
 59. R-Ill. 
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Fair Employment Practice Commission (FEPC) laws and those 
already in place at the state level had been resolved.61 Senator 
Dirksen believed that Title VII would provide benefits to an 
insufficient number of workers if only employers with 100 or more 
employees could be held liable under Title VII.62 
Senator Dirksen explained that, although the state FEPC acts had 
different minimum-employee requirements, each act set its minimum 
much lower than 100 employees.63 He also cited to an employment 
discrimination bill a Senate committee had reported on earlier in the 
year that defined an “employer” as a business having as few as eight 
employees.64 Senator Dirksen concluded that the minimum number of 
employees should not be set so high as to prevent the bill from being 
effective.65 
 60. Senator Dirksen, the Senate Minority Leader, stated that Title VII was the first part of 
the civil rights bill he looked at “because of its far-reaching character.” 110 CONG. REC. 13,087 
(1964). He continued, “a number of States have FEPC laws and have State-enforcing 
commissions [and] I thought if there were anything vulnerable in the bill, it would be Title 
VII.” Id.  
 61. Senator Dirksen stated: 
[W]e undertook to keep primary, exclusive jurisdiction in the hands of the State 
commissions for a sufficient period of time to let them work out their own problems at 
the local level. 
 It was a knotty problem, to say the least, because of the differences in approach of 
the Federal provision and the acts which are on the statute books today. All that, 
however, was worked out. 
Id. 
 62. Senator Dirksen stated: “I am afraid we shall really be subject to the charge that we 
are undertaking to emasculate the bill.” Id. 
 63. Id. Senator Dirksen argued: “Many of the statutes begin with one [employee]. In 
others it is four. In some cases it is five and six, and in some cases it is eight. However, I 
believe there are 8 or 10 States today which begin with as few as 1 employee.” Id. Senator 
Humphrey summarized the existing state statues and their coverage: 
It should be remembered that 25 States have fair employment laws. The laws of 23 of 
these States have more liberal coverage than the pending bill. . . Only Missouri and 
Illinois limit coverage to employers of 50 or more workers but even these two States 
are twice as liberal as what Senator Cotton proposes. 
Id. at 13,090–91. 
 64. Id. at 13,087 (citations omitted). 
 65. Senator Dirksen cited statistics showing that state statutes provided coverage to about 
sixty-nine percent of the workforce, leaving about thirty-one percent, or twenty-one million 
workers, who were not covered. Id. He questioned whether it would be proper “to set 31 percent 
of our working people over in one category and say that the law does not apply to them; 
whereas in the case of the remaining 69 percent, the law would apply.” Id. He stated that the 
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Senator Dirksen also responded to Sen. Cotton’s allegations that 
enforcement would prove too difficult. He cited labor statistics, using 
the manufacturing industry as an example, to show that adequate 
statistics were available to determine how many workers would 
remain without legal remedy under the Cotton amendment.66 
Senator Humphrey continued the opposition to the Cotton 
amendment. He stated that the President’s Committee on Equal 
Employment Opportunity, which President Kennedy had established 
by executive order, already provided far greater equal employment 
opportunity for the employees of businesses that did business with 
the federal government than Title VII would provide if the Senate 
passed the Cotton amendment.67 While under the direction of then-
Vice President Johnson, the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Committee provided thousands of people with equal-employment 
opportunities.68 According to Sen. Humphrey, the majority of 
minimum employee requirement, if set too high, “[would] produce a gaping hole in the bill and 
make it appear that we are trying to show partiality on one side and impartiality on another.” Id. 
 66. Senator Dirksen stated that there was “no difficulty in obtaining figures to show the 
number of employees, the number of reporting units, and the total amount of employment in 
every case.” Id. He offered manufacturing firm statistics showing 77,000 reporting units with 
between one and three employees, for a total of 140,000 employees. Id. at 13,087–88. There 
were 49,000 reporting units with between four and seven employees, for a total of 261,000 
employees. Id. at 13,088. His presentation of the statistics continued through the final group of 
employers, those with more than 500 employees. Id. Senator Dirksen then added: 
 What an amazing thing. If we are going to make that kind of distinction in this kind 
of bill, and make it only half effective or two-thirds effective, when it should be 
effective in every section, and with respect to every employer with a given number of 
employees, how can we justify [such a large number of employees to set as the cutoff] 
in the light of what is being done in the States today? 
Id.  
 67. Id. The executive order, issued on March 6, 1961, applied regardless of the number of 
workers employed by the company. Id. The only requirement was that the firm “[do] any 
business with the Government of the United States in the form of providing goods or services to 
the Government of the United States.” Id. 
 Senator Humphrey stated: 
What we provide [with Title VII] is much less stringent language, and much less in 
coverage than what was provided by the executive order [because] [t]he Federal 
Government is the largest purchaser of goods and services of any establishment in the 
world [and] the order applies to a firm that hires 5 persons, 1 person, 100 persons, 
1,000 persons, or 50,000, or 100,000. 
Id. 
 68. Id. 
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American businesses did not fall within the scope of the Title VII 
definition of “employer,” regardless of whether the minimum-
employee requirement was set at twenty-five or 100.69 However, if 
coverage instead extended to employers of twenty-five or more 
employees, Sen. Humphrey asserted that the number of covered 
employees would increase by more than forty percent.70 
Senator Humphrey pointed to Senate action on other labor bills 
imposing minimum-employee requirements much lower than the 100 
employee minimum proposed under the Cotton amendment.71 
Senator Joseph Clark72 joined the opposition, questioning whether 
there was any equity in the Cotton amendment.73 He argued that Title 
VII, if the Cotton amendment passed, would make “second-class 
citizens” out of a majority of the workforce.74 He concluded by 
stating that no acceptable reason existed for eliminating the majority 
of American workers from the equal opportunity Title VII was 
designed to provide.75 
 69. Senator Humphrey stated that of the three-million employers registered under the 
social security system, about eight percent (259,343) had more than twenty-five employees. Id. 
“In other words, under the bill as now drafted, 92 percent of the employers of America would 
not be covered. They would not be touched by the Federal statute . . . That cannot be regarded 
as a drastic imposition on the business community.” Id. 
   Under the Cotton amendment, Title VII would have covered less than two percent of the 
employers in America. Id. In terms of covered employees, the Senate leadership version of the 
bill would have covered nearly thirty million employees, while the Cotton amendment would 
have covered about twenty-one million employees. Id.  
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. He cited the fair labor standards bill and the Landrum-Griffin Act. Id. In the fair 
labor standards bill, an employer is covered if it has at least two employees. Id. The Landrum-
Griffin Act applied to every union and every employer, regardless of the number of employees. 
Id. Senator Humphrey stated: “I did not hear anyone say it was an imposition upon free 
enterprise, or that it would hamper small business, when we applied the provisions of the 
Landrum-Griffin Act to every employer.” Id. 
 72. D-Pa. 
 73. 110 CONG. REC. 13,089 (1964). 
 74. Senator Clark argued: 
 It seems to me the Cotton amendment would make second-class citizens out of 
employees of every small businessman, of every middle-sized businessman, of every 
businessman who has fewer than 100 employees . . . It would do so by denying equal 
employment opportunity to every individual who happened, by luck of the draw, to be 
a member of a smaller labor union or an employee of a small businessman.  
Id. 
 75. Id. 
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Senator Humphrey summarized the opposition’s concerns with the 
Cotton amendment, stating that it would limit the Civil Rights Act’s 
ability to protect American workers because less than two percent of 
American businesses would be covered.76 He suggested the American 
ideal of equal treatment, a source of inspiration for proponents of 
human rights outside of the United States, as further reason to protect 
as many workers as possible under Title VII.77 
Senator Cotton summarized the principles supporting his 
amendment, stating that while there was no question that racial 
discrimination is immoral, the Civil Rights Act, once passed, should 
be legislation the federal government could enforce “properly, 
efficiently, and effectively.”78 According to Sen. Cotton, the broad 
scope of Title VII supported by Senate leadership would lead to one 
of two problems. Either the enforcement officers would choose not to 
enforce the provision against small businesses, or, if Title VII was 
enforced against small businesses, it would lead to additional discord 
between the races in America.79  
Following this debate, the Senate defeated the Cotton amendment 
by a vote of sixty-three to thirty-four.80 Final approval of the civil 
rights bill was given in the Senate with the Title VII definition of 
 76. Id. at 13,090 (arguing that Sen. Cotton’s proposal covers “somewhat less than 1 3/4 
percent of the employers in [America]”. Senator Humphrey stated that the Cotton amendment 
would “drastically reduce the effectiveness and impact of [T]itle VII.” Id. He reasoned: 
“Plainly, the coverage [under the gradual reduction from 100 employees to 25 employees] is 
modest enough[,] and to reduce it to the extent proposed by Senator Cotton is a step of drastic 
proportions that has no justification whatsoever.” Id. 
 77. Senator Humphrey called on Congress to take a “significant step” in achieving “the 
principles of equality that have made us great and are the source of admiration and emulation 
throughout the world.” Id. at 13,091. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 13,092. Senator Cotton suggested that there was the potential for Title VII to 
lead to “more bitterness, more hatred, more race prejudice, and more strife” than what already 
existed. Id. Senator Cotton also concluded: 
[W]e have a bill that is all encompassing. Title VII is the most dangerous part of it, 
because it would lead the Federal Government with all of its power, majesty and 
bureaucracy into the way of dealing with a small businessman who can ill afford to 
protect himself, and in many cases his actions will be judged by the facts of the race or 
color involved and not by the facts of the case. 
Id. 
 80. Id. at 13,093. 
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employer as provided in the Dirksen-Mansfield substitute.81 The 
Senate version of the bill was sent to the House of Representatives, 
where it passed with little discussion or debate.82 
B. Title VII Employer Liability under the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Act of 1972 
Eight years after Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
Congress passed the Equal Employment Opportunity Act to address 
deficiencies in Title VII.83 The 1972 Act84 lowered the twenty-five 
employee minimum to fifteen85 to provide the benefits of the Civil 
Rights Act to more American workers.86 
A House Education and Labor Committee report stated that the 
twenty-five employee minimum did not provide protection for 
enough workers.87 The initial version of the Equal Employment 
 81. See id. The Senate definition included those businesses with “25 or more employees,” 
with the employee-minimum requirement being gradually reduced from 100 to 25 over the five-
year period following passage of the Civil Rights Act. Id. at 13,085 (detailing the Dirksen-
Mansfield amendment). 
 82. See H.R. REP. NO. 88–914, at 63 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2431–
32 (criticizing the quick passage of House Bill 7752 (amended House Bill 7152), the Senate 
version of the civil rights bill).  
 83. H.R. REP. NO. 92–238, at 3 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2139. The 
House report accompanying the bill stated that “the machinery created by the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 is not adequate” and that “[t]he persistence of discrimination, and its detrimental effects 
require a reaffirmation of our national policy of equal opportunity in employment.” Id.  
 84. Pub. L. No. 92–261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 
2000e–17).  
 85. Id. In addition to lowering the minimum-employee requirement, the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Act revised the definition of “employer” to include state and local 
governments. Id. 
 86. Representative Perkins, D-Ky., in support of the House version of the bill, which 
reduced the twenty-five employee minimum to eight, stated that “[t]his amendment to the [Civil 
Rights A]ct will assure Federal equal employment protection to virtually every segment of the 
Nation’s work force.” 117 CONG. REC. 31,961 (1972). 
 87. H.R. REP. NO. 92–238, at 20 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2155. The 
Education and Labor Committee report stated that “discrimination in employment is contrary to 
the national policy and equally invidious whether practiced by small or large employers.” Id. 
The report continued: 
Because of the existing limitation in the bill proscribing the coverage of Title VII to 25 
or more employees or members [of a union], a large segment of the Nation’s work 
force is excluded from an effective Federal remedy to redress employment 
discrimination . . . . [T]he committee feels that the [Equal Employment Opportunity] 
Commission’s remedial power should also be available to all segments of the work 
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Opportunity bill, passed in the House of Representatives as House 
Bill 1746, lowered the minimum requirement to eight employees.88 
However, when the bill reached the Senate,89 several senators 
raised concerns for small businesses. Senator Paul Fannin90 suggested 
the reduction would harm businesses and employees more than it 
would help.91 He stated that almost any business could acquire eight 
employees and, in doing so, the owner would then be unable to hire 
friends and relatives.92 Senator Fannin also addressed the arbitrary 
nature of using the number of employees to determine which 
businesses are liable under Title VII.93 
Senator Cotton, perhaps the strongest opponent to setting the 
employee minimum as low as twenty-five in 1964, argued once again 
in favor of small businesses.94 He suggested it would become even 
force. With the amendment proposed by the bill, Federal equal employment protection 
will be assured to virtually every segment of the Nation’s work force. 
Id.  
 88. See Steven K. Sanborn, Note, Employment Discrimination—Miller v. Maxwell’s 
International, Inc.: Individual Liability for Supervisory Employees Under Title VII and the 
ADEA, 17 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 143, 152 n.69 (1995) (citing H.R. 92–1746 (1971)). 
 89. The bill for equal employment opportunity was presented as Senate Bill 2515, and 
section 2 of the bill was proposed to amend section 701 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 
hold all businesses with eight or more employees liable under Title VII. 117 CONG. REC. 
31,711, 31,715 (1972).  
 90. R-Ariz. 
 91. See 118 CONG. REC. 2410 (1972). “I want to talk about what we are doing to the small 
businessman . . . [W]e are throwing up one roadblock after another to private enterprise.” Id. 
Senator Fannin continued: “We are building regulation-after-regulation that means only one 
thing—the little man does not have a chance.” Id. 
 92. Id. at 2411. “[A]ny type of small firm may find itself with eight employees. They start 
out small; they are successful; we want them to be successful. In many instances, they desire to 
employ their neighbors, their friends, their relatives. Should we block that operation?” Id. 
 93. Id. at 2409 (stating that “the new, arbitrary power we are granting the Equal 
Employment Opportunities Commission could be and would be used not only against small 
businesses and small factories, but against what are essentially family businesses”). He 
continued: 
 Now I am not arguing that family businesses nor any businesses should discriminate 
in employment. I fully believe that people should be hired for jobs on the basis of their 
ability and their compatibility with the tasks that are to be performed. Twenty-five is 
not any magic number, nor is the number eight. We might make it 50, or 20, or three, 
or perhaps total coverage of all businesses clear down to the number one, though I 
think this would be very inequitable. But to arrive at the figure of eight is just as 
inequitable. 
Id. 
 94. See supra notes 51–53 and accompanying text. “We have for years wept crocodile 
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more difficult to enforce Title VII if Congress lowered the employee-
minimum requirement below twenty-five.95 Senator Cotton also 
addressed the “practical situation”96 and the inability of statutes to 
completely solve the problem of discrimination.97 
Senator John Stennis98 argued that businesses with as few as eight 
employees would not have the resources to defend against EEOC 
investigations.99 He also expressed concern for what he believed to be 
an arbitrarily chosen number of eight employees.100  
tears and wrung our hands in sympathy about small business . . . . I have felt and I still feel that 
[the twenty-five employee minimum] is far too low. What have we here now?” 118 CONG. REC. 
2391 (1972).  
 95. Senator Cotton stated: 
[W]e can and we have and we should and we shall, as far as is fair and practicable in 
this law, apply it in favor of every American, and afford equal opportunity, equal 
social recognition and equal citizenship. However, when we go too far, the act 
becomes not a help but an irritant. And for my part, unless this bill were amended to 
maintain the minimum of 25 . . .  
 It would either be meaningless and only enforced in certain sections of the country 
and certain places or where certain conditions exist, or it will become a precedent. 
Id. at 2392. 
 96. Id. at 2393 (stating that “in a sense, when one tries to go so far in this perfectly 
laudable attempt to enforce equal rights—and nobody can gainsay that what we want is equal 
opportunity—as a practical matter, we may be making things more difficult”). 
 97. Senator Cotton concluded his remarks with the following argument: 
[W]e have reached the point now in this country when . . . the only way we can 
achieve what I am sure every one of us hopes and prays for, and that is the kind of 
society where no race, no creed, no nationality suffers discrimination, [is from within 
people’s hearts.] We cannot go the whole way, we cannot go the last mile, by a statute. 
We cannot enforce it with a bayonet. It has to be by the example of good and earnest 
people of both races seeking a society in which we can live together. 
Id.  
 98. D-Miss. 
 99. 118 CONG. REC. 2389 (1972). “When we get down to a firm that employs only eight, 
that is truly a very small business, one, as I have said, without the assets and capabilities to cope 
with the legal and administrative technicalities thrust upon them arbitrarily by a commission.” 
Id. Senator Stennis suggested: “To say that employers of down to a level of eight would have to 
comply and be subjected to all these restrictions . . . is just downright ridiculous. It is a 
requirement that those people cannot live with.” Id.  
 100. Id. He asked: 
 I wonder how the number eight got into the bill anyway. . . . Who suggested eight? 
Did that number come from the commission? Where did it come from? What kind of 
survey was made to see what were the capabilities of a little firm in a little town, even 
though it employed only eight persons? What resources does such a firm have? What 
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Though opposition to an eight-employee minimum was strong in 
the Senate, this provision in the House bill did receive some support. 
Senator Javits101 supported the reduction of the minimum requirement 
to eight.102 He suggested that many of society’s problems would be 
solved by increased employment opportunities for those traditionally 
discriminated against.103 Though the eight employee minimum failed 
to receive enough support to pass in the Senate, as a compromise, the 
Senate did pass an amendment to the House bill that changed the 
employee-minimum provision from eight to fifteen.104 When the 
Equal Employment Act of 1972 was finally enacted, the provision for 
a fifteen employee minimum became a part of Title VII.105 
are its capabilities? How can it cope with the Department of Justice? Of course it 
cannot cope with it. 
Id.  
 101. R-N.Y. 
 102. See 118 CONG. REC. 579 (1972). Senator Javits claimed Senate Bill 2515 was “a 
landmark measure, an effort to bring up to date the historic Civil Rights Act of 1964.” Id. He 
continued: 
I think I understand what makes the members of minorities and the poor, and those 
who are otherwise badly used in our society, have a failing of incentive . . . and there is 
nothing that is more important than employment [to provide such an incentive to 
succeed.] Indeed, employment is, in my judgment, the very key to the whole problem 
that we still face in this country, the most critical kind of emergency in respect of our 
relations with minorities, and especially the black minority of the United States. The 
critical element, whether we will or will not be successful or whether our country will 
be torn with strife, as it has been in the recent past, is employment. 
Id. 
 103. Id. He argued:  
 A man who has a job and a little money in his pocket is capable of everything: better 
housing, emergence from the slums, participation, better educational opportunity, a 
cessation of the rates of dependance on public agencies, including brushes with the 
law; but a man who does not have that kind of substance and status is a man who is not 
only bereft but also adrift, and it is the root of all our troubles. 
Id.  
 104. See id. at 3171. 
 105. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92–261, 86 Stat. 103 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e–17 (2000)). 
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C. Title VII Employer Liability under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 
The Civil Rights Act of 1991106 provided the most recent changes 
to Title VII. The 1991 Act provided for monetary damage awards to 
victims of discrimination.107 The employee-minimum, however, 
remained set at fifteen.108  
II. ANALYSIS 
Title VII exists to protect the employment interests of several 
classes of citizens that have suffered past discrimination, and are 
most likely to be subjected to future discrimination.109 During 
consideration of the original civil rights bill passed in the House, the 
House Judiciary Committee stated that the purpose of Title VII was 
to prevent discriminatory practices in the American workforce.110 
Title VII purports to prohibit discrimination on the basis of color, 
race, religion, sex, and national origin, but it does not serve as an 
absolute prohibition of discriminatory practices. For example, Title 
VII includes, as an affirmative defense to discrimination based on 
religion, sex, and national origin, the “bona fide occupational 
qualification” exception to liability.111 Also, an employer may have, 
 106. Pub. L. No. 102–166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 1201–1224; 
29 U.S.C. § 626; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1988, 2000e to 2000e–16 (2000)). For a comparison 
between this Act and the Civil Rights Act of 1990 that President George H.W. Bush vetoed, see 
J. R. Franke, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: Remedial Civil Rights Policies Prevail, 17 S. ILL. U. 
L.J. 267 (1993). 
 107. As stated in a House report, the purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was “to 
provide monetary remedies for victims of intentional employment discrimination to compensate 
them for resulting injuries and to provide more effective deterrence.” H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(I), 
at 14 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 552. The Act provides for both 
compensatory and punitive damages. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a(b)(1)–(2) (2000). 
 108. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000). 
 109. See id. § 2000e–2.  
 110. See H.R. REP. NO. 88–914, at 63 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2401 
[hereinafter Judiciary Committee Report]. The Committee report stated that the purpose for 
Title VII was to “eliminate, through the utilization of formal and informal remedial procedures, 
discrimination in employment based on race, color, religion, or national origin. [Title VII] 
authorizes the establishment of [the EEOC] and delegates to it the primary responsibility for 
preventing and eliminating [discriminatory] employment practices.” Id.  
 111. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(e)(1) (2000). The provision states: 
[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ 
employees . . . on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those certain 
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as a requirement for employment, an exam to measure an applicant’s 
ability to perform certain job functions.112 Even if this exam has a 
disparate impact on members of a group protected under Title VII, 
the Act permits a measure of abilities that are “job related.”113 Title 
VII is designed to promote a workforce in which jobs are available to 
people of different backgrounds on an equal basis. Exceptions for 
“bona fide occupational qualifications” and exams measuring “job 
related” abilities are acceptable because they serve important societal 
goals. An exemption from Title VII based on the number of 
employees does not meet this standard.  
The liability exemption under Title VII for businesses with fewer 
than a certain number of employees has provided benefits to the 
statutory non-employer, and in doing so it served to hinder the 
progress that could have been achieved in the American workplace 
during the past four decades. In 1972, Congress decided they set the 
employee minimum too high and excluded a “large segment of the 
Nation’s work force . . . from an effective Federal remedy to redress 
employment discrimination.”114 Though the House passed House Bill 
1746, which amended the Title VII definition of employer to include 
those who employ “eight or more employees,”115 to get through the 
instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational 
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business 
or enterprise . . . .  
Id. 
 112. The Supreme Court provided an explanation of the burdens placed on the parties in 
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, stating that “Title VII forbids the use of employment tests that 
are discriminatory in effect unless the employer meets ‘the burden of showing that any given 
requirement [has] . . . a manifest relationship to the employment in question.’” Albemarle Paper 
Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). The Court 
continued, “If an employer does then meet the burden of proving that its tests are ‘job related,’ 
it remains open to the complaining party to show that other tests or selection devices, without a 
similarly undesirable racial effect, would also serve the employer’s legitimate interest in 
‘efficient and trustworthy workmanship.’” Id. 
 113. For a discussion of the three kinds of studies available for an employer to justify 
selection procedures (content, construct, and criterion-related), see Zamlen v. City of Cleveland, 
906 F.2d 209, 218 (6th Cir. 1990). 
 114. SENATE SUBCOMM. ON LABOR, COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 92D 
CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972, at 80 
(Comm. Print 1972). 
 115. Id. 
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Senate, a minimum-employee requirement of fifteen employees was 
established.116  
The 1972 reduction was a positive development, but it did not 
solve the problem of discrimination in the American workforce. The 
fifteen employee minimum for Title VII liability fails to provide the 
“fair and full employment” opportunities that President Kennedy 
recognized as vital forty years ago.117 As a remedial measure, 
Congress should amend Title VII to include as many American 
workers as possible. The moral issue, whether discrimination based 
on race, color, sex, religion, or national origin is acceptable in the 
workplace, does not turn on the number of people a business 
employs;118 Title VII liability should not be determined by that figure 
either. 
Even some opponents of the employee-minimum requirement 
had, prior to the passage of the 1972 Title VII provisions, agreed that 
discrimination was immoral.119 The opponents of the employee-
minimum, however, argued it would be too heavy a burden for small 
businesses to defend against discrimination claims.120 
Two basic arguments underlie the rationale used by those opposed 
to setting a lower minimum requirement. However, in light of the 
important purpose behind Title VII—the elimination of employment 
discrimination121—these two arguments are insufficient to sustain an 
employee-minimum requirement. 
First, the need for a business to maintain a collegial work 
environment is not unique to small businesses. Every business 
benefits from a healthy work environment. The largest corporations 
are best served by employing workers who get along. Discriminatory 
means, however, should not be a tolerated avenue to achieving a 
harmonious work environment. 
 116. See id. 
 117. Special Message, supra note 1, at 488. 
 118. As Senator Morse stated during the debate leading up to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
this “is a moral issue.” 110 CONG. REC. 13,089 (1964). He stated that the “basic issue” in the 
debate over Title VII was “the immorality of discrimination.” Id. 
 119. Senator Fannin remarked: “Now I am not arguing that family businesses nor any 
businesses should discriminate in employment.” 118 CONG. REC. 2409 (1972).  
 120. See supra notes 30–33 and accompanying text. 
 121. See supra notes 109–10 and accompanying text. 
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Further, regardless of the size of the corporation, a particular 
employee really only works “with” a few people. Large corporations 
are often divided into subsidiaries, offices, divisions, and teams. It is 
conceivable that a large corporation would have many autonomous 
working units that employ fewer than fifteen employees. Taken to the 
extreme, a corporation could argue that each of its many working 
units would be best served if allowed to make hiring decisions based 
on race or religion or sex. Clearly, this can not be allowed. 
Preventing discrimination is far too important an objective to set 
aside in favor of a large corporation’s hiring preferences. Preventing 
discrimination should also prevail over similar desires held by small-
business owners.  
The second argument, that small businesses cannot afford to 
defend against discrimination charges and lawsuits, also is not 
convincing. The genuine need to combat discrimination continues to 
exist today. Title VII, to most effectively achieve its goals, should 
apply to every business. This governmental interest should prevail 
over the concerns regarding litigation costs. 
Additionally, looking to the number of employees to set Title VII 
liability limitations does not accurately reflect the actual ability a 
business may have to defend against discrimination claims. A better 
indicator would be the financial stability, assets, and revenues 
generated by the business. Further, the U.S. Code includes other 
statutory provisions holding employers liable to civil suit in which 
the statutory definition of “employer” does not allow businesses to 
escape liability based on a certain number of employees.122 If a small 
business may be held liable in suit under these statutes, the business 
should also be covered under Title VII. 
Title VII cannot “eliminate, through the utilization of formal and 
informal remedial procedures, discrimination in employment”123 if 
businesses are allowed to remain outside of its parameters. The 
arguments for allowing these businesses to escape Title VII liability 
 122. See, e.g., The Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001–2009 
(2000). This statute defines “employer” as “includ[ing] any person acting directly or indirectly 
in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee or prospective employee.” Id. 
§ 2001(2). It also provides very similar remedies to Title VII. See id. § 2005(c), cf. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e–5(g) (2000) (listing the remedies available for a Title VII claim). 
 123. Judiciary Committee Report, supra note 110. 
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are insufficient to trump the important goal of discrimination-free 
employment. 
One final consideration is the number of American workers who 
remain uncovered by Title VII because of the fifteen-employee 
minimum. Department of Labor statistics indicate this number is a 
significant portion of the workforce. In Employment and Wages, a 
bulletin of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, employment statistics from 
the first quarter of each year from 1992 to 2001 show a significant 
portion of the workforce in private industry is employed by a 
business that falls outside of the Title VII definition of “employer.”124 
In each of those years, the number of workers employed at businesses 
with nine or fewer employees exceeds 13.5 million.125 This amounts 
to at least fourteen percent of American workers left uncovered.126 
Adding the third category of workers, those who work at businesses 
with “10 to 19 workers,” shows that no fewer than twenty-three 
million workers were employed at businesses with nineteen or fewer 
employees in any given year.127 The percentage of uncovered workers 
employed at these businesses each year was about one quarter of the 
 124. The statistics are not classified in a manner that shows precisely how many people 
work at statutory non-employers. The categories are broken down as follows: “fewer than 5 
workers,” “5 to 9 workers,” “10 to 19 workers,” “20 to 49 workers,” and so forth, with the final 
category showing those employers with “1000 or more workers.” See BUREAU OF LABOR 
STATS., DEP’T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES ANNUAL AVERAGES, 1992, at 532 tbl. 9 
(1993) [hereinafter EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES 1992]. Therefore, the number of workers with 
no federal legal remedy under Title VII lies somewhere between the number of workers at 
businesses with nine or fewer employees (the first two categories, combined) and those who 
work at businesses with nineteen or fewer employees (the first three categories, combined). 
While these statistics provide an inexact account of the problem, it is clear that a large number 
of American workers remain outside the provisions of Title VII. 
 125. The number of employees at companies who have nine or fewer employees ranges 
from a low of 13,514,513 in 1992 to a high of 15,520,979 in 2001. Id.; BUREAU OF LABOR 
STATS., DEP’T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES ANNUAL AVERAGES, 2001, at 45 tbl.3 
(2002) [hereinafter EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES 2001]. 
 126. In 2001, 14.2% of employees in private industry were employed at businesses with 
nine or fewer employees, the lowest percentage for the ten-year period. EMPLOYMENT AND 
WAGES 2001, supra note 125, at 45 tbl.3. In 1993, 15.6% of the employees were employed at 
businesses with nine or fewer employees, the highest percentage. EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES, 
1993, at 532 tbl.9 (1994) [hereinafter EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES 1993]. 
 127. In 1992, over 23,009,500 workers worked at businesses with nineteen or fewer 
employees. EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES 1992, supra note 124, at 532 tbl.9. By 2001, that 
number had risen to 27,110,237 workers. EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES 2001, supra note 125, at 
45 tbl.3. 
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total private workforce.128 Accordingly, for each of the ten most 
recent years for which statistics are available, between fourteen and 
twenty-six percent of the workers in private industry work for a 
business exempt from Title VII liability.129 This is a significant 
portion of the American workforce.  
III. PROPOSAL 
The minimum-employee requirement should be eliminated. The 
justifications given for the employee-minimum in the original version 
of Title VII,130 if they were ever valid, are now moot.131 Allowing 
employment discrimination by some small businesses because of 
concerns that preventing it would place upon them too great a burden 
frustrates the broad, remedial purpose of Title VII. While relations 
between and across the Title VII classification groups may have 
improved from the 1950s and 1960s, the tensions between racial and 
religious groups in America are still very real today.132 By providing 
 128. The years 2000 and 2001 had the lowest percentage of workers, with 24.9% each year. 
BUREAU OF LABOR STATS., DEP’T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES ANNUAL AVERAGES 
2000, at 535 tbl.9 (2001); EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES 2001, supra note 125, at 45 tbl.3. In 
1993, 26.5% of the workers were employed by businesses with nineteen or fewer workers, the 
highest percentage. EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES 1993, supra note 126, at 532 tbl.9. 
 129. See supra notes 126–30 and accompanying text. 
 130. See supra notes 31–33 and accompany text. 
 131. See supra text accompanying notes 121–29. The collegial atmosphere of a small 
business, as well as concerns regarding the ability to defend against suit, should not be 
protected at the expense of non-discriminatory work opportunities. See id. There is also no 
longer a concern for how the new EEOC will perform its duties like that raised by Senator 
Cotton in 1964. See supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text. The EEOC has a thirty-five 
year track record, during which it has made strides toward preventing discrimination in the 
American workplace. See, e.g., EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, THE STORY OF 
THE UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISION: ENSURING THE 
PROMISE OF OPPORTUNITY FOR 35 YEARS 1 (2000). 
 132. A clear example of the tension existing in the religious context stems from the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001. Following the attacks, American society took a distinct turn 
against members of the Muslim faith. See Muqtedar Khan, Putting the American in ‘American 
Muslim’, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2003, § 4, at 13. 
 In the racial context, Senator Lott, R-Miss., caused a controversy in December 2002, when 
he made racially insensitive remarks in honoring a Senate colleague. Dan Goodgame & Karen 
Tumulty, Tripped Up By History, TIME, Dec. 23, 2002, at 22. The public outcry against Sen. 
Lott was strong and swift, and soon after the incident he stepped down as the Senate Majority 
Leader. Douglas Waller, Lott: The Fallout, TIME, Dec. 30, 2002, at 24. 
 Additionally, the issue of affirmative action in public institutions of higher education 
provided two of the most controversial rulings in the most recent term of the United States 
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Title VII protection to all employees and prospective employees, 
President Kennedy’s call for “fair and full employment” may be 
brought closer to becoming a reality.133  
A business owner should retain the right to hire a member of his 
or her own family. This right is both justifiable and reasonable. 
However, this is not the same as allowing businesses to refuse to hire 
job applicants on the basis of color, race, sex, national origin, or 
religion.134 
When balancing the interests of a business owner in making 
employment decisions with the Title VII goals of preventing 
discrimination from interfering with employment relationships, the 
ideals of a non-discriminatory hiring practice should outweigh a 
business owner’s desires. 
CONCLUSION 
Title VII protections of the employment relationship exist to 
combat employment discrimination based on one of five 
characteristics: race, religion, color, sex, and national origin. These 
characteristics represent groups that have historically been 
discriminated against. A Title VII exemption for businesses with 
fewer than fifteen employees is neither necessary, nor justifiable. In 
light of the remedial purpose underlying—to protect the employment 
relationship from discrimination—Congress should eliminate the 
fifteen employee minimum. Holding all businesses accountable for 
discriminatory employment practices would best serve the rationales 
that led to the passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.  
Supreme Court. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), and Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 
(2003), show that a majority of Supreme Court Justices believe that the effects of past 
discrimination against African Americans are still felt today.  
 133. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 134. A business owner’s hiring of a family member should not be viewed as discriminating 
on the basis of one of the Title VII characteristics. Rather, it is the purposeful search for 
employees who share, for example, the owner’s religious beliefs or national origin that Title VII 
was designed to prohibit.  
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